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life-cycle. In a final series of tests, I show that this relationship holds only in 
instances where corporate governance and creditor rights are strong. Hence,  
the agency cost of equity and debt version of the outcome model of dividends 
holds at all stages of the corporate life-cycle. Finally, I find no evidence in 
support of the equity-only version of the substitution model of dividends. 
Keywords: corporate governance; agency models of dividends; corporate  
life-cycle; creditor rights; emerging markets. 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: O’Connor, T. (2013)  
‘The relationship between dividend payout and corporate governance along  
the corporate life-cycle’, Int. J. Corporate Governance, Vol. 4, No. 1,  
pp.20–50. 
Biographical notes: Thomas O’Connor lectures in Finance at the Department 
of Economics, Finance and Accounting, NUI Maynooth, Ireland. His research 
interests are corporate finance, dividend policy, capital structure, international 
cross-listings, stock market liberalisations, and corporate governance. 
 
1 Introduction 
La Porta et al. (2000) present two agency cost models of dividends. The first model,  
what they term the outcome model, suggests that dividends are an outcome of effective 
governance, where governance can be either country governance i.e., legal rules or 
corporate governance, or their interaction (see Mitton, 2004; Bartram et al., 2012).  
Given the agency costs of free cash flow, shareholders prefer dividends to retained 
earnings since dividends reduce the pool of funds which can be consumed privately by 
controlling insiders/managers (see Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 1984). Presumably, 
 while all shareholders have a preference for dividends given free cash flow, the outcome 
model suggests that it is the shareholders with the greatest legal rights (and/or belonging 
to better-governed firms) which can extract the largest dividends from firms. Hence,  
the theoretical prediction of the outcome model is that dividend payout increases in 
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shareholder rights and free cash flow. However, when better-governed firms are young, 
growing fast, but still unprofitable (and thus presumably with negative free cash flow), 
recent work suggests that their shareholders do not demand larger dividends (La Porta  
et al., 2000; Mitton, 2004; Chae et al., 2009; Bartram et al., 2012). In effect,  
they substitute lower current dividends for expected higher future dividends. In stark 
contrast, the shareholders of young, yet poorly-governed firms do not agree to lower 
current dividends, and seek to extract as much as they can from firms in the form of a 
dividend. The logical conclusion from this line of reasoning, which is implicit in the 
assumptions underlying the agency models of dividends, is that the outcome model is 
more likely to prevail when firms are ‘mature’ (i.e., when they are characterised as 
having diminished investment opportunities, experience slower growth, are profitable, 
and as a result have positive free cash flow), but not necessarily so when firms are 
‘immature’. 
The second model, referred to as the substitution model suggests that there exists a 
negative relationship between the strength of shareholder rights (and/or corporate 
governance) and corporate dividend payout. The underlying cause for this negative 
relationship relies on the notion that dividends paid can serve a bonding role for  
poorly-governed firms. The management of poorly-governed firms substitute higher 
(current and future) dividends for poor governance. They do so because higher dividends 
serve to establish a reputation for equitable treatment of current (and prospective 
shareholders), which in turn should allow these firms to access external capital at a much 
lower cost than they would have otherwise (Chen et al., 2009). In contrast, ‘immature’ 
better-governed firms, whom are much less likely to be financially constrained,  
but are growing fast, pay lower dividends, which is acceptable to their shareholders 
(Mitton, 2004; Chae et al., 2009). Consequently, this line of reasoning suggests that  
the substitution model of dividends is much more likely to manifest when firms are 
‘immature’. 
In this paper, I examine the relationship between the strength of shareholder rights 
and the extent of corporate dividend payout along the corporate life-cycle. To do so,  
I exploit cross-sectional differences in corporate maturity, and test the outcome and 
substitution models of dividends for ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms. This approach 
contrasts notably with almost all other studies, since these studies test both agency 
models of dividends (or total payout), either in a single-year or in a panel setting, using a 
samples of firms at very different stages of their life-cycles. One of the shortcomings 
with this approach is that these tests assume that at any point in time, the agency models 
are mutually-exclusive, and as such, either the outcome or substitution model will 
prevail, but not both. However, since the outcome and substitution models are likely to 
manifest at different stages of the corporate life-cycle, tests which examine these models 
along the corporate life-cycle open up the possibility that both models can prevail for  
the same sample of firms, in the same time period (or periods), once we explore the 
relationship between governance and dividend payout for ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms 
separately. In this paper, I explore this possibility. 
To perform these tests, I collect a sample of 220 firms from 21 emerging market 
countries. Like Mitton (2004), I test the agency models of dividends using shareholder 
rights measured at the corporate level (i.e., corporate governance), and when I include 
‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms together, I, like him find evidence in support of the 
outcome model. When I treat these same firms separately, I find no evidence to suggest 
that the equity-only version of the substitution model prevails when firms are ‘immature’. 
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In contrast, the outcome model manifests all along the corporate life-cycle i.e.,  
for ‘immature’ and ‘mature’ firms. In a final set of tests, I find that the outcome model 
only prevails in instances of strong shareholder and creditor rights. Where creditor rights 
are weak, even given strong shareholder rights, dividend payouts tend to be much lower. 
Hence, the original agency cost of equity (i.e., the costs associated with the conflict 
between management/controlling insider and shareholders/outsiders) version of the 
outcome model of dividends, inclusive of the agency costs of debt equity (i.e., the costs 
associated with the conflict between the providers of capital to the firm, namely 
shareholders and creditors), which predicts that dividends are an outcome of strong 
shareholder and creditor rights, holds. 
Thus, in summary, this paper serves to further our understanding of the agency 
models of dividends in a number of ways. First, I show that in an emerging market 
setting, the outcome model of dividends prevails at all stages of the corporate life-cycle 
for a sample of emerging market firms. Second, I show that this same relationship is 
contingent on strong shareholder and creditor rights. While this finding is not new, my 
findings here in this paper do serve to confirm the recent work of Brockman and  
Unlu (2009), Shao et al. (2009), Byrne and O’Connor (2012), who all highlight the 
profound influence that creditors exert over corporate dividend policy. What is new is 
that I show that this influence is exerted over the entire corporate life-cycle. Finally,  
I find no evidence in support of the substitution model of dividends. This finding 
suggests that even in countries where bonding devices are few (see Benos and Weisbach, 
2004); poorly-governed firms do not appear to utilise dividends in a bonding role. 
Presumably, these firms use alternative bonding mechanisms (e.g., international  
cross-listings; development of strategic alliances).  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present a brief literature review 
and develop two hypotheses. From here, I describe the data and present the empirical 
findings. I end with some concluding remarks. 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
In this paper I test two agency models of dividends, namely the outcome and substitution 
models of La Porta et al. (2000) at different stages of the corporate life-cycle.  
The corporate life-cycle model of dividends (see for example Grullon et al. (2002),  
DeAngelo et al. (2006), Bulan et al. (2007), Denis and Osobov (2008)) suggests that the 
likelihood of paying a dividend in the first instance, and the dividend amount increases 
over the corporate life-cycle. The factors which determine the payout decision over  
the corporate life-cycle specifically relate to the firm’s investment opportunity set, the 
growth rate of the firm, the cost of external capital, and the agency costs associated  
with free-cash flow. Entirely inconsistent with the signalling models of dividends, which 
suggest that ‘immature’ firms pay dividends, the life-cycle model of dividends suggests 
that firms first pay a dividend, and continue to do so when they reach ‘maturity’.1 Mature 
firms are characterised as those whose internally-generated funds are more than sufficient 
to meet their diminished investment opportunity set, have lower and more stable growth 
rates, are profitable, but have positive and increasing free cash flow. For mature firms, 
dividends serve to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Easterbrook, 
1984). In stark contrast, internal funds are not sufficient to meet the investment needs of 
fast-growing, unprofitable ‘immature’ firms. For these firms, there is neither the funds 
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available, nor the necessity from an agency perspective (no agency costs of free cash 
flow) to pay a dividend. In summary, according to the life-cycle model of dividends, and 
all else equal, ‘mature’ firms initiate and continue to pay dividends; ‘immature’ firms do 
not.2 
The outcome and substitution models of dividends are theoretically grounded in 
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. Both models agree that dividends paid to 
shareholders serve to reduce agency costs. In the case of the outcome model, dividends 
paid to shareholders serve to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow.3 In the case of the 
substitution model, dividends paid serve to substitute for poor governance, and hence 
serve to reduce the agency costs of poor quality governance (as opposed to free cash 
flow). However, they disagree on one crucial point, namely the direction of the 
relationship between the strength of corporate governance and the likelihood of paying a 
dividend and the dividend amount (payout). Let’s elaborate further. Both begin with  
the premise that given free cash flow, shareholders (outsiders) prefer dividends  
to retained earnings, since expropriation of free cash flow by self-serving insiders is 
value-decreasing for minority shareholders. On the one hand, the outcome model 
suggests that the ability on the part of shareholders to force firms to pay dividends rests 
crucially on the efficiency of the corporation’s governance system. Thus, the outcome 
model predicts that the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount (payout) 
increases when free cash flow exists and where shareholder rights are strong (Chae et al., 
2009).4,5 Numerous studies have found support in favour of the outcome model using 
either shareholder rights measured at the firm (corporate governance) or country level, or 
both (e.g., Mitton, 2004; Chae et al., 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Adjaoud and Ben-Amar, 
2010; Bartram et al., 2012; Brockman and Unlu, 2009, 2011; Byrne and O’Connor, 2012; 
Shao et al., 2009; Sawicki, 2009) in post-Asian crisis Asia (Petrasek, 2012; Francis et al., 
2011).6 
On the other hand, the substitution model suggests otherwise. It predicts that  
poorly-governed firms, presumably with sizable agency conflicts, and wishing to enhance 
their reputation for equitable treatment of outsiders (presumably to raise external capital 
at lower cost) pay large dividends. In doing so these firms commit to fair treatment of 
their minority shareholders, not just in the current period, but also subsequent periods 
because dividend cuts are unlikely since they are costly. The very fact that these firms 
wish to access external capital at cheaper cost by paying reputationally-enhancing 
dividends implicitly implies that these firms are in the early stages of their life-cycle, 
since ‘mature’ firms, by definition, have internal funds which more than meets their 
investment needs. The substitution model suggests that better-governed firms, without the 
necessity to enhance their reputation, pay smaller dividends than their less well-governed 
counterparts. Consequently, the substitution model predicts that, all else equal, dividend 
payouts decrease in shareholder rights, and in contrast to the predictions of the outcome 
model, (poorly governed) firms voluntarily, rather than under duress from shareholders 
(of firms with efficient governance), pay large dividends. As is the case for the outcome 
model, there exists plenty of empirical support for the substitution model (e.g., John and 
Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2011; Jo and Pan, 2009; Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; Chae et al., 
2009; Sawicki, 2009) in pre-Asian crisis Asia and Mitton (2004) in civil law countries 
only).7 Brockman and Unlu (2011) show that the substitution model prevails in countries 
where disclosure environments are opaque and the outcome model in countries where 
disclosure environments are transparent. Shao et al. (2009) and Byrne and O’Connor 
(2006) find support in favour of the substitution model where creditor rights are weak. 
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From a theoretical viewpoint, there is no reason to suggest that the relationship 
between the strength of country and/or corporate governance and dividend payout is 
static i.e., does not change over time. In a dynamic setting, both Liu (2002) and  
O’Connor (2006) find support in favour of the outcome and substitution models of 
dividends. They show that dividend payouts are greatest when country (Liu, 2002), or 
corporate (O’Connor, 2006) governance is strong (i.e., the outcome model prevails),  
but changes in governance lead to lower dividends (i.e., the substitution model prevails). 
Liu (2002) finds that dividend payouts tend to be greatest in countries who score highly 
in variables which account for country-level governance (the outcome model),  
but country-level governance reforms (changes) are associated with lower dividends  
(the substitution model). O’Connor (2006) finds likewise, but instead uses corporate in 
place of country governance. He shows that exchange trading cross-listing Level 2/3 
ADR firms substitute dividends for enhanced bonding, even though dividends remain 
higher in firms from countries with strong governance (the outcome model).  
Sawicki (2009) examines the agency models of dividends around the time of the  
Asian crisis. The substitution model prevails pre-crisis, while the outcome model prevails 
post-crisis. 
Along similar lines, it is likely that the outcome and substitution models will prevail, 
but most likely, at different stages along the corporate life-cycle. For a number of 
reasons, the outcome model of dividends is much more likely to manifest when firms are 
‘mature’. First, the outcome model rests crucially on the prevalence of free cash flow, 
which is likely to be of much greater relevance for mature firms since internally 
generated cash is more than sufficient to fund their diminishing investment opportunities 
(see Grullon et al., 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008). In support, 
Chae et al. (2009) show that for US firms, the dividend amount increases in free cash 
flow and the strength of corporate governance. Second, the outcome model is much less 
likely to manifest for well-governed ‘immature’ firms, since the shareholders of these 
firms generally accept lower dividends given firm growth and external financing needs 
(see Mitton, 2004; Chae et al., 2009; Bartram et al., 2012). In contrast, the shareholders 
of poorly-governed firms do not. Third, the separation of ownership from control which 
results in agency conflicts (and costs) between managers and minority shareholders is 
likely to be much more prevalent in complex, large ‘mature’ organisations. In contrast,  
in smaller, younger ‘immature’ firms, managers are much more likely to have a large 
controlling stake in the firm, thus reducing agency conflicts, since their interests are 
likely to be much better aligned with outsiders. As a result, the need for dividends to 
reduce the agency costs of free cash flow is more relevant for ‘mature’ firms and less 
relevant for ‘immature’ firms. Hence the agency costs of free cash flow are likely to be 
more severe for ‘mature’ firms. This line of reasoning leads to the first testable 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The outcome model of dividends is more likely to prevail when firms 
are ‘mature’. 
The substitute model is likely to be much more relevant for ‘immature’ firms. Firms are 
much more likely to require external financing when they are young, ‘immature’, and 
with abundant growth opportunities. Since the costs of external financing are likely to be 
much higher for opaque, poorly-governed firms (see Chen et al., 2009); there is a much 
greater incentive on the part of these firms to build reputation by paying large dividends. 
Hence, immature, young, opaque, and poorly-governed firms, with a need for external 
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financing, may seek to establish a reputation for fair treatment of their minority 
shareholders by paying a dividend even given negative free cash flow. This, in turn may 
serve to reduce their cost of capital. Since bonding mechanisms are few in emerging 
markets, the emergence of the substitution model when firms are immature is a viable 
possibility (Benos and Weisbach, 2004). In contrast, there is much less of an incentive on 
the part of better-governed firms to follow suit since their cost of capital is likely to be 
much lower, and, as already alluded to, the shareholders of these firms do not demand 
large dividends given firm growth and external financing needs (see Mitton, 2004; Chae 
et al., 2009; Bartram et al., 2012). This leads to the second testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The substitution model of dividends is likely to prevail when firms are 
young and ‘immature’. 
3 Data 
In this paper I examine the relationship between the strength of corporate governance  
and corporate dividend policy in emerging markets along the corporate life-cycle.8  
To measure the strength of corporate governance, I follow Mitton (2004) and others (see 
for example, Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Chen et al., 2009), and use 
the corporate governance scores developed by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA, 
2001). The CLSA governance ratings range from a low of 0 to a high of 100 with higher 
values suggesting better quality corporate governance. The rating for each individual 
firm, for which there is 495 in total across 25 countries, is a composite measure of  
57 qualitative, binary questions which span seven distinct governance categories, namely 
management discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, 
fairness, and social awareness. The first six governance provisions have a 15% weighting 
in the composite index, while social awareness has a 10% weighting. The rating for each 
firm is constructed by CLSA analysts. In this paper, I use the first six governance 
provisions to construct the composite governance measure, with each given equal 
weighting, since dividend payout is unlikely to be related to social awareness.  
I use three different dividend payout measures, namely dividends-to-earnings (%), 
dividends-to-cashflow (%), and dividends-to-sales (%).9 All data is sourced from 
Worldscope at year end 2001. In all regressions, I control for firm size, firm profitability, 
firm growth, cash holdings, total equity and retained equity. Size and profitability are 
expected to impact positively on dividend policy. In contrast, high growth firms typically 
pay smaller dividends.10 The expected relationship between cash holdings and dividend 
payout is ambiguous. Firms with high cash reserves but with little or no demand for 
external finance are likely to pay a dividend. In contrast, firms with anticipated future 
growth opportunities may finance their growth with their cash reserves, and refrain from 
paying a dividend. I proxy for the firms maturity or position along its life-cycle by using 
either earned equity (retained earnings) to book assets (RE/TA) or earned equity (retained 
earnings) to total equity (RE/TE) (see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; 
Brockman and Unlu, 2011). DeAngelo et al. (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008) and 
Brockman and Unlu (2011) all show that dividend payout increases in RE/TA  
(and RE/TE), since as firms mature, the contribution of earned equity (relative to 
contributed equity) to total equity (and total assets) increases, since firms become more  
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profitable and have a reduced investment opportunity set, reducing the need for external 
(contributed) capital, which ultimately results in free cash flow. Mature (Immature) firms 
are characterised with high (low) ratios of retained equity to total assets and retained 
equity to total equity. Total equity (to total assets) is included as an additional control in 
the dividend regressions, so that the impact of total equity financing (TE) is not 
confounded with the effect of the composition of equity financing (RE) on dividend 
payout (See DeAngelo et al., 2006). All financial firms and firm observations with 
missing or abnormal data i.e., firms with negative earnings, negative total assets,  
and negative cashflow are eliminated. All firm level variables are winsorised at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. 
I include two country-level determinants of dividend policy, namely shareholder and 
creditor rights. The early literature suggests that dividends can be an outcome of, or 
substitute for, shareholder rights. More recent work incorporates the agency costs of debt 
(i.e., the conflict between shareholders and creditors) and estimates the joint effect of 
shareholder and creditor rights on corporate dividend policy (see Brockman and Unlu, 
2009; Shao et al., 2009; Byrne and O’Connor, 2012). I use the revised version of the  
anti-director rights measure from Spamann (2010) to account for the strength of 
shareholder rights at the country-level. Since this data is missing for China, Hungary,  
and Poland, I use the Djankov et al. (2008) measure of shareholder rights for these 
countries. Higher values reflect better shareholder protection. The creditor rights measure 
is from Djankov et al. (2007) and ranges from a low of zero to a high of four, where 
higher values represent greater levels of creditor protection. A description of the variables 
employed in this paper is provided in Appendix 1. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main data items of interest by country. 
From my original sample, I lose 275 firms since some or all of the firm-level control 
variables are missing for these firms, resulting in a final sample of 220 publicly-traded 
firms (see Column labelled ‘# Firm 1’).11 These 220 firms come from 21 countries, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Korea (Republic), Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The number of firms varies 
considerably by country. Taiwan (31 firms) followed by Hong Kong (25) and Malaysia 
(22) supply the largest number of firms. In contrast, there is just a single firm from 
Argentina, Colombia, Hungary, and Peru in the final sample of firms. The fourth, fifth 
and sixth columns of Table 1 contain the mean, median and standard deviation corporate 
governance score by country. The median firm is best-governed in Peru (76.5), Singapore 
(67.4), and Argentina (66.7). In contrast, the median firm is poorly governed in Pakistan 
(33.6) and Poland (37.7).12 Interestingly, while the median firm from Pakistan has the 
lowest governance score of all firms in the sample, the greatest variation in governance 
scores occurs in Pakistan (standard deviation is 20.2). Hence, there are firms in Pakistan 
which are much better governed than their median counterpart. There is much less 
variation in corporate governance practices in Mexico (standard deviation is 4.0), Chile 
(4.2), and Korea (5.8). Overall, the median firm has a corporate governance score of 55.8, 
with a standard deviation of 14.6.13 The average firm is best governed in Peru (76.5), 
followed closely by firms from Singapore (69.2) and Mexico (66.8). The average firm is 
least well-governed in Poland (37.7).14 
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Table 1 Sample description 
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In columns 7–15, I outline the mean, median and standard deviation dividend payout  
by country, using all three dividend payout measures. They suggest that as a percentage 
of earnings, the median firm in Hungary (85.5%) and Pakistan (76.8%) pay the largest 
dividends. Dividend payouts tend to be much lower in the Philippines (5.3%) and Korea 
(5.9%). The sole firms from Argentina and Poland pay no dividend at all in 2001. When 
using either cashflow or sales, dividend payouts tend to be high in Colombia (median 
dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) is 82.2% and 6.0%, respectively), 
and Pakistan (median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) is 71.1% and 
9.7%, respectively). The median firm pays much lower dividends in Brazil (median 
dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) are 9.5% and 2.9%, respectively), 
Korea (median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) are 3.0% and 0.2%, 
respectively), and Taiwan (median dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%) 
are 9.3% and 1.1%, respectively). In the full sample, the median firm pays 23.4%, 15.4%, 
and 2.2%, of its earnings, cashflow, or sales, respectively, in the form of a dividend. 
Average dividend payouts relative to earnings, cashflow, and sales are greatest in 
Hungary (85.5), Colombia (82.2), and Hong Kong (10.0), respectively.15 
The mean, median and variation in retained equity to total assets (RE/TA)  
are presented in columns 16–18 of Table 1. Retained equity, relative to either total assets 
or total equity (unreported), is much higher in Mexico (the median retained equity to total 
assets (total equity) is 0.42 (0.98)), Peru (0.41 and 0.52, respectively), and Hong Kong 
(0.19 and 0.45, respectively). In contrast, retained equity is much lower in Colombia  
(the median retained equity to total assets (total equity) is 0.03 (0.05)), Hungary (0.01 and 
0.01, respectively), and Korea (0.01 and 0.01, respectively). These figures suggest that 
there is considerable heterogeneity in terms of firm maturity across the sample of firms. 
The median firm has retained equity, scaled by either total assets or total equity, of 0.12 
and 0.27, respectively. The average firm tends to be most mature in Peru (RE/TA is 
0.41), and the least mature in Hungary (RE/TA is 0.01). 
Columns 19 and 20 of Table 1 suggest that country-level shareholder protection is 
highest in Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa and Taiwan (all have a shareholder rights 
measure of 5), and the lowest in China (Shareholder rights score of 1). Creditor 
protection is strongest in Hong Kong (Score of 4), and the weakest in Colombia and 
Mexico (Both have creditor rights scores of 0) (see columns 19 and 20 of Table 1).  
A priori, the sign on the shareholder and creditor rights variables are expected to be 
positive.  
4 Methodology 
In this section I begin by examining the relationship between the strength of corporate 
governance and dividend payout. Then I proceed to examine this aforementioned 
relationship separately for firms at different stages of the corporate life-cycle. I end by 
examining these same relationships by the strength of creditor rights. 
I begin by estimating Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the following 
form: 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7
DIV GOV Size Growth Profitability Cash
TE RE Industry Country
i i i i i i
i i i c i
α β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + +  (1) 
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1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV Size Growth Profitability Cash
TE RE SR CR Industry
i i i i i i
i i c c i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +  (2) 
where DIVi is either dividends-to-earnings (%), dividends-to-cashflow (%), or  
dividends-to-sales (%), and GOVi is the CLSA corporate governance score for each firm. 
Size, growth, profitability, cash, TE, and RE, are firm size, firm growth, firm 
profitability, firm cash, firm total equity, and firm retained eaquity (to total assets or total 
equity), respectively. Industryi are industry dummies, CountryC country dummies, and 
SRC and CRC, shareholder and creditor rights, respectively.16 In equation (2), country 
dummies are excluded when shareholder and creditor rights are included. All regressions 
are estimated with White (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. The 
coefficient estimates from estimating equations (1) and (2) are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Regression estimates 
Dividend payout measure  
Dividends to  
earnings (%) 
Dividends to  
cashflow (%) 
Dividends to  
sales (%) 
Ordinary least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.369** 
(2.20) 
0.438*** 
(3.44) 
0.270* 
(1.91) 
0.340*** 
(3.05) 
0.070** 
(2.12) 
0.071*** 
(2.86) 
Size 1.862 
(1.08) 
1.554 
(1.04) 
0.615 
(0.42) 
0.219 
(0.18) 
0.547* 
(1.66) 
0.442* 
(1.68) 
Growth –29.690** 
(2.06) 
–27.235** 
(2.18) 
2.691 
(0.22) 
2.893 
(0.27) 
–3.065 
(1.02) 
–2.359 
(0.91) 
Profitability 18.308 
(0.80) 
8.653 
(0.48) 
26.156 
(1.49) 
20.806 
(1.42) 
12.467*** 
(3.04) 
10.816*** 
(2.88) 
Cash 8.099 
(0.44) 
9.541 
(0.57) 
7.611 
(0.52) 
11.278 
(0.86) 
3.731 
(0.97) 
4.354 
(1.19) 
Total equity  15.975 
(1.11) 
20.804 
(1.56) 
8.712 
(0.67) 
13.970 
(1.21) 
8.893*** 
(3.10) 
8.897*** 
(3.48) 
Retained 
equity  
16.864** 
(2.46) 
13.471** 
(2.15) 
9.548 
(1.51) 
5.821 
(1.03) 
0.475 
(0.49) 
0.214 
(0.23) 
Shareholder 
rights  
 –0.485 
(0.21) 
 0.382 
(0.24) 
 –0.425 
(0.97) 
Creditor rights  1.588 
(0.69) 
 3.004 
(1.46) 
 0.475 
(1.08) 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Country 
dummies 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.388 0.306 0.457 0.390 0.508 0.448 
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Table 2 Regression estimates (continued) 
Dividend payout measure  
Dividends to  
earnings (%) 
Dividends to  
cashflow (%) 
Dividends to  
sales (%) 
Weighted least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.456** 
(2.35) 
0.382** 
(2.32) 
0.387** 
(2.56) 
0.311*** 
(2.70) 
0.093*** 
(2.97) 
0.063** 
(2.57) 
# Firms 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Country 
dummies 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.594 0.403 0.640 0.517 0.591 0.475 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary and weighted least squares 
regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis. 
The coefficient estimates from the ordinary (weighted) least squares regressions are 
presented in the top (bottom) panel. In the weighted least squares regressions, the weight 
of each observation (firm) is the inverse of the number of observations (firms) in each 
country. The sample period is for the year 2001. The dependent variable is dividends  
to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated.  
All other variables are defined in the main text and in Appendix 1. Shareholder rights 
data is from Spamann (2010) and Djankov et al. (2008) (for China, Hungary, and 
Poland), and creditor rights data is from Djankov et al. (2007). All firm-level data is 
sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001).  
A full-set of country and industry dummies are included where indicated, but not 
reported. # Firms is the number of firms, and *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
5 Results 
The findings presented in Table 2 are in line with Mitton (2004), and others, and provide 
support in favour of the outcome model of dividends. The coefficient estimates on the 
corporate governance variable are always positive and statistically different to zero.  
They range from a low of 0.07 (t = 2.12; p < 0.05) (using dividends to sales (%)) to a 
high of 0.438 (t = 3.44; p < 0.01) using dividends to earnings (%).17 These coefficient 
estimates imply that a one standard deviation change in corporate governance (14.6), 
which is close to the difference in the median corporate governance score for firms from 
India (53.4) and Singapore (67.4), changes dividend payout by 6.39 percentage points 
using dividends to earnings (%) (0.438 × 14.6), 4.96 percentage points using dividends to 
cashflow (%) (0.340 × 14.6), and 1.037 percentage points using dividends to sales (%) 
(0.071 × 14.6). While not always statistically significant, the firm-level control variables 
are of the correct sign. Large and profitable firms pay higher dividends. Growth firms 
tend to pay lower dividends. Furthermore, and consistent with the life-cycle model of 
dividends, dividend payout (at least using dividends to earnings (%)) increases with 
corporate maturity i.e., when the ratio of retained equity to total assets increases.18  
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I find no evidence to suggest that corporate dividend payouts increase in country-level 
shareholder and creditor rights.19 This contradicts the evidence presented in  
La Porta et al. (2000) and Mitton (2004) in the case of shareholder rights, and Brockman 
and Unlu (2009), Shao et al. (2009), Byrne and O’Connor (2012) in the case of creditor 
rights. The latter three all highlight the profound influence that creditors have, over and 
above shareholders, in determining corporate dividend payout. 
In the remaining rows of Table 2, I address the concern that the results are driven by 
the large number of observations provided by some countries. To address this concern,  
I estimate equations (1) and (2) using weighted least squares, where the weight of each 
observation (firm) is the inverse of the number of observations in each country, so that 
each country receives an equal weighting in the estimation. When I do so, the general 
conclusions remain unaltered. Dividend payouts remain an outcome of effective 
corporate governance. The coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable 
remain positive and are always statistically significant.20 
In summary, the findings are consistent with Mitton (2004), and many others, and 
provide support for the outcome model of dividends. Shareholders use their legal rights, 
in this instance measured at the firm-level, to extract large dividends from firms. All else 
equal, dividend payouts are greater in better governed firms. Next, I examine whether this 
relationship changes along the corporate life-cycle.  
5.1 Results by stage of corporate life-cycle 
To do so, I sub-divide my original sample of firms by level of retained equity (either to 
total assets or total equity) and re-estimate equation 1 for each sub-sample of firms. 
Using the original sample of 220 firms, I create two groups of firms, divided at  
the sample median of RE/TA (and RE/TE). Thus, each group has 110 firms each. 
Equation (1) is estimated separately for both sets of firms and the coefficient estimates 
are presented in Table 3. All firm, industry, and country controls are included, but not 
reported. Table 3 suggests that the outcome model prevails, but only at the later stage of 
the corporate life-cycle, since the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance 
variable is only positive and statistically significant in the regressions estimated for 
‘mature’ firms only i.e., with above-median RE/TA.21 Furthermore, in two of the three 
cases, the difference in the coefficient estimates of the corporate governance variable 
between ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms is statistically significant (t-statistic is 2.39; 
p < 0.01, and 1.78, p < 0.10, when dividend payout is dividends to earnings (%) and 
dividends to sales (%), respectively).22 The conclusions remain unaltered in the weighted 
least squares regressions. 
These findings suggest that the outcome model holds, but only when firms are 
‘mature’. These results support Hypothesis 1, but not Hypothesis 2, since I find no 
evidence in support of the substitution model. Emerging market firms do not appear to 
substitute (large) dividends for poor governance. Finally, my results do not appear  
to be driven by the difference in the number of observations across countries, since the 
weighted least squares regressions also support the notion that the outcome model 
manifests, but only when firms are ‘mature’. 
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Table 3 Regression estimates by level of RE/TA 
Dividend payout ratio 
Dividends to  
earnings (%) 
 Dividends to  
cashflow (%) 
 Dividends to  
sales (%) 
Life-cycle stage Life-cycle stage Life-cycle stage 
 
Low RE/TA 
(Immature) 
High RE/TA 
(Mature) 
Low RE/TA 
(Immature)
High RE/TA 
(Mature) 
Low RE/TA 
(Immature) 
High RE/TA 
(Mature) 
Ordinary least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.241 
(0.84) 
0.392* 
(1.87) 
0.164 
(0.70) 
0.285 
(1.18) 
0.010 
(0.01) 
0.170*** 
(3.26) 
# Firms 110 110 110 110 110 110 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.605 0.516 0.592 0.516 0.538 0.557 
 Tests of significance (t-test) 
 2.39*** 0.88 1.78* 
Weighted least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.491 
(1.42) 
0.322* 
(1.67) 
0.408 
(1.45) 
0.331* 
(1.65) 
0.054 
(0.92) 
0.192*** 
(4.20) 
# Firms 110 110 110 110 110 110 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.770 0.680 0.782 0.588 0.628 0.665 
 Tests of significance (t-test) 
 1.98** 0.30 1.66* 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary and weighted least squares 
regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis.  
In the weighted least squares regressions, the weight of each observation (firm) is the 
inverse of the number of observations (firms) in each country. The sample period is for 
the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms with high (above-median) and 
low (below-median) retained equity to total assets (RE/TA). The dependent variable is 
dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%),  
as indicated. A full set of firm-level controls (Controls), country and industry  
dummies are included, but not reported. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. 
Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, 
and *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
The significance tests (t-statistic) test whether the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable is statistically different in different stages of the corporate life-cycle. 
The test-statistic is calculated by estimating the following regression and testing the 
statistical significance of β2. High RE/TA equals 1 if RE/TA is above the sample median, 
and zero otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
DIV GOV GOV High RE/TA Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE High RE/TA Industry Country
i i i i i i i
i i i i c i
α β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
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5.2 Results by stage of corporate life-cycle and strength  
of creditor rights 
Next, I examine whether shareholders in mature well-governed firms are still able to 
extract large dividends from firms when creditor rights are weak. I do so, since recent 
work suggests that creditors exert a greater influence over corporate dividend payout than 
do shareholders (see Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Shao et al., 2009; Byrne and O’Connor, 
2012). Their collective work shows that the outcome model of dividends, inclusive of the 
agency costs of equity and debt, is contingent on strong shareholder and creditor rights.23 
Where creditor rights are weak, creditors demand presumably by way of debt covenants, 
and firms consent, to pay lower dividends, in spite of strong shareholder rights  
(Smith and Warner, 1979; Kalay, 1982). Where creditor rights are strong, creditors 
consent to larger dividend payouts, but only in instances where shareholder rights are 
strong (Shao et al., 2009). 
If the same holds true here in this analysis, and there is no reason to expect otherwise, 
then a priori, I would expect that the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance 
variable to be large when creditor rights are strong and firms mature, and much smaller 
for mature firms in countries where creditor rights are weak. Hence, the shareholders  
of better-governed firms may not be able to extract large dividends if creditor rights  
are weak. This is unlikely to be a real concern for shareholders of firms in Malaysia 
(Median (Mean) corporate governance is 60.3 (57.2) and creditor rights is 3), South 
Africa (Median (Mean) corporate governance is 64.3 (63.7) and creditor rights is 3), and 
Singapore (Median (Mean) corporate governance is 67.4 (69.2) and creditor rights is 3) 
since the median firm tends to be well-governed in these countries and creditor rights 
strong. In contrast, the median (and mean) firm is well-governed in Brazil (median  
and mean governance is 61.8 and 59.1, respectively), but creditor rights weak (1)  
(see Table 1). 
In Table 4, I estimate equation 1 now by firm maturity and strength of  
creditor rights.24 The top panel contains the coefficient estimates for the high  
RE/TA group of firms, and the bottom panel the low RE/TA firms.25 The coefficient 
estimates suggest the following. When I sub-divide the mature firm sample by strength  
of creditor rights, and estimate equation (1) separately for each (i.e., above and  
below-median creditor rights), I find that the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable are positive for both sets of firms, but only statistically  
significant where creditor rights are strong. Where creditor rights are strong,  
the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable range from 0.206 (t = 3.69; 
p < 0.01) (using dividends to sales (%)) to 0.464 (t = 2.26, p < 0.05) (using dividends  
to earnings (%)). Furthermore, when compared to instances in which creditor  
rights are weak, the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable  
are larger where creditor rights are strong, and the difference between the two  
is statistically significant (t-statistic is 2.00; p < 0.05 using Dividends to Cashflow (%) 
and 1.67; p < 0.10, using Dividends to Sales (%)).26 These findings suggest that  
for mature firms, dividends are an outcome of strong corporate governance and  
creditor rights. 
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Table 4 Regression estimates by level of RE/TA and creditor rights 
Dividend payout measure 
Dividends to  
earnings (%) 
 Dividends to  
cashflow (%) 
 Dividends to  
sales (%) 
 
Low  
creditor 
High  
creditor 
Low  
creditor 
High  
creditor 
Low  
creditor 
High  
creditor 
High RE/TA (Mature) 
Corporate 
governance 
0.176 
(0.55) 
0.388 
(1.51) 
–0.072 
(0.23) 
0.464** 
(2.26) 
0.102** 
(2.19) 
0.206*** 
(3.69) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Firms 52 58 52 58 52 58 
R-squared 0.079 0.321 0.239 0.183 0.336 0.272 
 Tests of significance (t-test) 
 1.42 2.00** 1.67* 
Low RE/TA (Immature) 
Corporate 
governance 
0.087 
(0.40) 
0.976*** 
(2.86) 
0.190 
(1.05) 
0.499* 
(1.97) 
0.010 
(0.11) 
0.036 
(0.58) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Firms 74 36 74 36 74 36 
R-squared 0.256 0.409 0.257 0.281 0.291 0.355 
 Tests of significance (t-test) 
 2.45*** 2.06*** 1.54 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares with heteroscedastic 
consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is for the year 
2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms with high (above-median) and low 
(below-median) retained equity to total assets (RE/TA), domiciled in countries with high 
(above-median) and low (below-median) creditor rights. The dependent variable is 
dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%),  
as indicated. A full set of controls are included, but not reported. All firm-level data is 
sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001).  
# Firms is the number of firms, and *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. The significance tests (t-statistic) test whether the coefficient 
estimates on the corporate governance variable is statistically different in different 
creditor rights regimes (Above and below-median creditor rights). The test-statistic is 
calculated by estimating the following regression and testing the statistical significance of 
β2. High Creditor equals 1 if creditor rights are greater than 2, and zero otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV GOV High Creditor Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE RE/TA High Creditor Industry
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
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Next, I perform the same analysis, but now for ‘immature’ firms i.e., firms with  
below-median RE/TA. When I do so, I find support in favour of the outcome model, but 
only where creditor rights are strong. The coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable are positive and statistically significant, but only where creditor 
rights are strong (Using dividends to earnings (%) (Coefficient is 0.976; p < 0.01) and 
dividends to cashflow (%) (Coefficient is 0.499; p < 0.10)). Where creditor rights are 
weak, the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance measure are much lower, and 
always statistically insignificant.27 Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable are significantly larger where creditor rights are strong. 
6 Robustness 
Next, I examine whether my findings are robust to;  
• the inclusion of taxation in the dividend regressions 
• the inclusion of the social awareness component of the CLSA corporate governance 
measure 
• an alternative corporate life-cycle proxy 
• to alleviate concerns in relation to sample selection bias, a larger sample size.  
First, I begin by examining whether my findings are robust to the inclusion of a measure 
of the taxation of dividend income (relative to share repurchase income) in the dividend 
regressions. Since dividend and share repurchase income is typically tax differently both 
within and across countries, a priori, one would expect dividend payments to be lower 
where share repurchases are tax advantaged relative to dividend income, all else equal. In 
fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that this is the case (see La Porta et al., 2000). 
Like La Porta et al. (2000) and others (see Bartram et al., 2012), I include the tax 
advantage (disadvantage) of dividends variable in all regressions, which is measured as 
the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends over the after-tax value of one 
dollar paid out in capital gains. I source this variable from Bartram et al. (2012) and 
Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010).28 In Table 1 (Column 21) the dividend tax advantage variable 
is outlined for all countries bar Colombia. Only in Thailand (1.029) is dividend  
income tax advantaged relative to capital gains income in 2001. In contrast, dividend 
income is tax disadvantaged in all other countries, with the exception of Argentina,  
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru and South Africa, where dividend income is  
neither tax-advantaged nor disadvantaged relative to share repurchase income. The 
analysis presented in Table 5 suggests that my findings are robust to the inclusion of the 
dividend tax advantage variable. For example, using dividends to earnings (%), dividend 
payout remains an outcome of effective governance (see column labelled (Full Sample), 
coefficient estimate is 0.383, t-stat is 2.89; p < 0.01), and during all stages of the 
corporate life-cycle (see columns under (Life-Cycle Stage), 0.504, t-stat is 2.70; p < 0.01 
for ‘immature’ firms and 0.345, t-stat is 1.67; p < 0.10, for ‘mature’ firms), but only 
where creditor rights are strong (see remaining columns of Table 5). For example,  
for ‘mature’ firms, the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable is  
0.434 (t-stat is 1.74; p < 0.01) under strong creditor rights and –0.358 (t-stat is 0.73).  
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The difference between these coefficient estimates is statistically significant (t-stat is 
1.70; p < 0.10).29 Interestingly, the dividend tax advantage variable is never statistically 
significant in any of the regressions, but always positive for ‘mature’ firms and negative 
for ‘immature’ firms.30 
Table 5 Including dividend tax advantage 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High RE/TA  
(Mature)  
Low RE/TA  
(Immature) 
 
Full sample 
Low RE/TA 
(Immature) 
High RE/TA 
(Mature) 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Ordinary least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.383*** 
(2.89) 
0.504*** 
(2.70) 
0.345* 
(1.67) 
0.434* 
(1.74) 
–0.358 
(0.73) 
0.704* 
(1.78) 
0.147 
(0.64) 
Size 1.363 
(0.91) 
4.699** 
(2.22) 
–0.082 
(0.04) 
3.780 
(1.00) 
0.929 
(0.30) 
0.530 
(0.18) 
5.974* 
(2.00) 
Growth –28.627** 
(2.26) 
11.839 
(0.68) 
–68.055*** 
(4.32) 
–83.059***
(5.10) 
–5.974 
(0.19) 
–0.643 
(0.05) 
40.248* 
(1.71) 
Profitability 13.064 
(0.72) 
27.658 
(1.15) 
–21.918 
(0.99) 
–35.654 
(1.16) 
–45.197 
(1.11) 
46.589 
(1.38) 
63.168* 
(1.66) 
Cash 8.701 
(0.52) 
24.470 
(0.99) 
10.502 
(0.56) 
52.761 
(1.09) 
2.095 
(0.07) 
21.011 
(0.67) 
15.252 
(0.36) 
Total equity 18.823 
(1.39) 
30.263* 
(1.66) 
5.142 
(0.27) 
–10.258 
(0.41) 
30.865 
(0.89) 
–29.512 
(1.21) 
41.812* 
(1.89) 
Retained 
equity 
13.504** 
(2.33) 
–4.216 
(0.84) 
–3.057 
(0.15) 
–21.110 
(0.66) 
36.854** 
(2.20) 
5.699 
(1.13) 
–32.355** 
(2.13) 
Shareholder 
rights 
–0.251 
(0.11) 
–1.682 
(0.52) 
–2.976 
(0.77) 
3.254 
(0.33) 
5.084 
(0.90) 
8.899 
(0.85) 
–1.359 
(0.32) 
Creditor rights 1.112 
(0.48) 
–4.494 
(1.22) 
4.711 
(1.39) 
28.732** 
(2.55) 
8.266 
(0.56) 
22.994* 
(1.94) 
–7.326 
(0.63) 
Dividend tax 
advantage 
24.039 
(1.41) 
–31.045 
(1.27) 
34.876 
(1.30) 
43.661 
(0.63) 
91.337 
(1.10) 
–67.799 
(1.28) 
–76.105 
(1.54) 
# Firms 219 109 110 58 52 36 73 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.311 0.469 0.359 0.619 0.407 0.871 0.472 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  1.60 1.70* 1.92* 
 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    The relationship between dividend payout and corporate governance 37    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Table 5 Including dividend tax advantage (continued) 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High RE/TA  
(Mature)  
Low RE/TA  
(Immature) 
 
Full sample 
Low RE/TA 
(Immature) 
High RE/TA 
(Mature) 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Weighted least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.389** 
(2.40) 
0.612*** 
(2.83) 
0.342* 
(1.66) 
0.467* 
(1.93) 
–0.128 
(0.24) 
0.627 
(1.54) 
0.233 
(0.85) 
# Firms 219 109 110 58 52 36 73 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.394 0.602 0.482 0.648 0.571 0.873 0.660 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  1.67* 2.09** 1.45 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary and weighted least squares 
regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis. 
The weight of each observation (firm) in the weighted least squares regressions is the 
inverse of the number of observations (firms) in each country. The sample period is for 
the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for the full sample of firms, for firms 
with high (above-median, ‘mature’) and low (below-median, immature’) retained equity 
to total assets (RE/TA), and for ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms in countries with high 
(above-median i.e., creditor rights measure greater than 2) and low (below-median i.e., 
creditor rights measure less than and equal to 2) creditor rights. The dependent variable is 
dividends to earnings (%). All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Dividend  
Tax Advantage variable measures the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends 
divided by the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in capital gains, and is sourced  
from Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoeven (2012) and Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010). 
Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, 
and *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
The significance tests (t-statistic) test whether the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable is statistically different in either different stages of the corporate  
life-cycle (equation (1)) or in different creditor rights regimes (equation (2)). In both 
instances, the test-statistic is calculated by estimating either equation (1) or equation (2), 
and testing the statistical significance of β2. High RE/TA equals 1 if RE/TA is above the 
sample median, and zero otherwise. High Creditor equals 1 if creditor rights are greater 
than 2, and zero otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
DIV GOV GOV High RE/TA Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE High RE/TA Industry Country
i i i i i i i
i i i i c i
α β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (1) 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV GOV High Creditor Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE RE/TA High Creditor Industry
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (2) 
Next, I examine whether my findings are robust to the inclusion of social awareness in 
the CLSA corporate governance measure.31 The results presented in Table 6 suggest that 
they are. Here again, dividend payout increases in the strength of corporate governance 
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(the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance variable is 0.426 and statistically 
significant (t-stat 3.09; p < 0.01), and 0.408 (t-stat is 2.52; p < 0.05) in the weighed least 
squares regressions). Once again, the outcome model prevails all along the corporate  
life-cycle (the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable is positive and 
statistically significant for ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms), but only where shareholder 
and creditor rights are strong (The coefficient estimate is 0.578 (t-stat is 2.03; p < 0.05) 
under strong creditor rights and 0.794 (t-stat is 1.94; p < 0.10) under weak creditor 
rights). 
Table 6 Including dividend tax advantage and social awareness in corporate governance 
measure 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High RE/TA  
(Mature)  
Low RE/TA  
(Immature) 
 
Full 
sample 
Low RE/TA 
(Immature) 
High 
RE/TA  
(Mature) 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Ordinary least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.426*** 
(3.09) 
0.538*** 
(2.70) 
0.429* 
(1.97) 
0.578** 
(2.03) 
–0.277 
(0.49) 
0.794* 
(1.94) 
0.116 
(0.51) 
Size 1.405 
(0.94) 
4.771** 
(2.25) 
0.049 
(0.03) 
4.171 
(1.15) 
0.867 
(0.28) 
0.433 
(0.16) 
6.082** 
(2.04) 
Growth –28.580** 
(2.26) 
11.731 
(0.67) 
–67.306***
(4.27) 
–81.756***
(5.06) 
–6.662 
(0.21) 
–0.528 
(0.04) 
41.092* 
(1.78) 
Profitability 13.977 
(0.77) 
28.295 
(1.20) 
–21.651 
(1.00) 
–33.047 
(1.08) 
–49.343 
(1.19) 
49.538 
(1.49) 
62.598 
(1.63) 
Cash 9.045 
(0.55) 
26.424 
(1.07) 
10.253 
(0.55) 
53.380 
(1.13) 
3.957 
(0.14) 
25.662 
(0.80) 
16.832 
(0.41) 
Total equity 18.267 
(1.35) 
29.881* 
(1.66) 
3.347 
(0.17) 
–8.863 
(0.36) 
27.960 
(0.710 
–28.933 
(1.22) 
41.796* 
(1.89) 
Retained equity  13.396** 
(2.29) 
–4.469 
(0.90) 
–2.661 
(0.13) 
–24.125 
(0.75) 
36.657** 
(2.21) 
4.687 
(0.97) 
–31.484** 
(2.10) 
Shareholder 
rights 
–0.454 
(0.20) 
–1.934 
(0.59) 
–3.239 
(0.85) 
1.326 
(0.13) 
4.936 
(0.86) 
5.804 
(0.56) 
–1.332 
(0.31) 
Creditor rights 1.227 
(0.53) 
–4.418 
(1.20) 
5.034 
(1.49) 
27.176** 
(2.43) 
8.568 
(0.54) 
21.400* 
(1.86) 
–7.498 
(0.64) 
Dividend tax 
advantage 
23.742 
(1.40) 
–30.303 
(1.26) 
31.611 
(1.17) 
52.684 
(0.76) 
91.166 
(1.09) 
–66.048 
(1.44) 
–76.765 
(1.56) 
# Firms 219 109 110 58 52 36 73 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.315 0.470 0.368 0.629 0.401 0.879 0.470 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  1.93* 1.67* 1.77* 
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Table 6 Including dividend tax advantage and social awareness in corporate governance 
measure (continued) 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High RE/TA  
(Mature)  
Low RE/TA  
(Immature) 
 
Full 
sample 
Low RE/TA 
(Immature) 
High 
RE/TA  
(Mature) 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Weighted least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.408** 
(2.52) 
0.643*** 
(2.80) 
0.424** 
(1.98) 
0.612** 
(2.21) 
0.209 
(0.41) 
0.745* 
(1.76) 
0.212 
(0.73) 
# Firms 219 109 110 58 52 36 73 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.395 0.601 0.492 0.657 0.573 0.882 0.659 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  1.09 2.10** 1.82* 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary and weighted least squares 
regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis. 
The weight of each observation (firm) in the weighted least squares regressions is the 
inverse of the number of observations (firms) in each country. The sample period is for 
the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for the full sample of firms, for firms 
with high (above-median, ‘mature’) and low (below-median, ‘immature’) retained equity 
to total assets (RE/TA), and for ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms in countries with high 
(above-median i.e., creditor rights measure greater than 2) and low (below-median i.e., 
creditor rights measure less than and equal to 2) creditor rights. The dependent variable is 
dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%),  
as indicated. A full set of controls are included, but not reported. All firm-level data is 
sourced from Worldscope. Dividend Tax Advantage variable measures the after-tax value 
of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in 
capital gains, and is sourced from Bartram, Brown, How and Verhoeven (2012) and 
Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010). Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001),  
and include the social awareness component. # Firms is the number of firms, and *, **, 
and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
The significance tests (t-statistic) test whether the coefficient estimates on the corporate 
governance variable is statistically different in either different stages of the corporate  
life-cycle (equation (1)) or in different creditor rights regimes (equation (2)). In both 
instances, the test-statistic is calculated by estimating either equation (1) or equation (2), 
and testing the statistical significance of β2. High RE/TA equals 1 if RE/TA is above the 
sample median, and zero otherwise. High Creditor equals 1 if creditor rights are greater 
than 2, and zero otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
DIV GOV GOV High RE/TA Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE High RE/TA Industry Country
i i i i i i i
i i i i c i
α β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (1) 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV GOV High Creditor Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE RE/TA High Creditor Industry
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (2) 
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In Table 7, I examine whether these same findings are robust to the use of an alternative 
proxy for the firm life-cycle. My choice of alternative proxy is motivated by recent work, 
which shows that corporate cash holdings decrease monotonically over the corporate  
life-cycle (Dittmar and Duchin, 2011), because, amongst others, the firm’s investment 
opportunity set diminishes, and presumably the need for cash diminishes (Ferreira and 
Vilela, 2004). With this in mind, I classify ‘mature’ (‘immature’) firms as those with cash 
holdings (scaled by book assets) above (below) the sample median ratio of cash to book 
assets, respectively. Once again, I find that the outcome model prevails all along the 
corporate life-cycle, but only where creditors (and shareholders) are well protected.  
For example, for ‘immature’ firms the coefficient estimate on the corporate governance 
variable is 0.626 (t-stat is 1.69; p < 0.10) under strong creditor rights and –0.369 (t-stat is 
1.39) given weak creditor rights. 
In Table 8, I try to address concerns regarding sample selection bias. My sample is 
small because on the one hand, the number of firms followed by the CLSA is small, and 
of these firms, the retained equity variable (RE/TA and RE/TE) is only available for  
220 firms. My ability to alleviate concerns surrounding sample selection bias is limited, 
because I cannot include developed market firms and create a much larger sample size 
because of lack of data availability. What I can do is increase my sample size by using an 
alternative corporate life-cycle measure e.g., corporate cash holding, which is available 
for more than the 220 firms in my original sample. When I use corporate cash holdings to 
proxy for the corporate life-cycle, the sample of firm’s increases from 220 to 281 firms 
(see Column labelled ‘# Firm 2’ in Table 1). The additional firms come from India  
(48 firms compared to just 13 before), and Singapore (26 firms compared to 18 before).32 
The results presented in Table 8 suggest that my earlier findings do extend to a larger 
sample of emerging market firms. Dividend payout is an outcome of effective 
governance, at all stages of the corporate life-cycle, but only where shareholder and 
creditor rights are strong. 
Table 7 Using cash holdings to proxy for stage of corporate life-cycle 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High cash/TA  
(Immature)  
Low cash/TA  
(Mature) 
 
Full 
sample 
Low 
cash/TA 
(Mature) 
High 
cash/TA 
(Immature) 
High  
CR 
Low 
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Ordinary least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.426*** 
(3.09) 
0.502** 
(2.17) 
0.194 
(1.02) 
0.626* 
(1.69) 
-0.369 
(1.39) 
0.491** 
(2.05) 
-0.458 
(0.50) 
        
# Firms 219 109 110 51 59 43 66 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.315 0.331 0.459 0.548 0.707 0.311 0.491 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  2.08*** 2.32*** 2.65*** 
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Table 7 Using cash holdings to proxy for stage of corporate life-cycle (continued) 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High cash/TA  
(Immature)  
Low cash/TA  
(Mature) 
 
Full 
sample 
Low 
cash/TA 
(Mature) 
High 
cash/TA 
(Immature) 
High  
CR 
Low 
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Weighted least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.408** 
(2.52) 
0.450* 
(1.93) 
0.047 
(0.24) 
0.621* 
(1.72) 
-0.294 
(1.12) 
0.537** 
(2.30) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
        
# Firms 219 109 110 51 59 43 66 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.395 0.569 0.542 0.583 0.759 0.341 0.508 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  2.14*** 2.44*** 2.56*** 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary and weighted least squares 
regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis. 
The weight of each observation (firm) in the weighted least squares regressions is the 
inverse of the number of observations (firms) in each country. The sample period is for 
the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for the full sample of firms, for firms 
with high (above-median, ‘immature’) and low (below-median, ‘immature’) cash to  
total assets (Cash/TA), and for ‘mature’ and ‘immature’ firms in countries with high 
(above-median i.e., creditor rights measure greater than 2) and low (below-median i.e., 
creditor rights measure less than and equal to 2) creditor rights. The dependent variable is 
dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%),  
as indicated. A full set of controls are included, but not reported. All firm-level data is 
sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA (2001).  
# Firms is the number of firms, and *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. The significance tests (t-statistic) test whether the coefficient 
estimates on the corporate governance variable is statistically different in either different 
stages of the corporate life-cycle (equation (1)) or in different creditor rights regimes 
(equation (2)). In both instances, the test-statistic is calculated by estimating either 
equation (1) or equation (2), and testing the statistical significance of β2. Low Cash/TA 
equals 1 if Cash/TA is below the sample median, and zero otherwise. High Creditor 
equals 1 if creditor rights are greater than 2, and zero otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
DIV GOV GOV Low Cash/TA Size Growth Profitability
Low Cash/TA TE RE/TA Industry Country
i i i i i i i
i i i i c i
α β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (1) 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV GOV High Creditor Size Growth Profitability
Cash/TA TE RE/TA High Creditor Industry
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (2) 
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7 Conclusions 
In this paper, I test the outcome and substitution models of dividends of La Porta et al. 
(2000) along the corporate life-cycle. I present two hypotheses. The first (and second) 
state that the outcome (substitution) model of dividends is most likely to prevail when 
firms are ‘mature’ (‘immature’). To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to test these 
two hypotheses using a sample of emerging market firms. Using a sample of 220 firms 
from 21 emerging markets, I find no evidence to suggest that the substitution model 
prevails in emerging markets. In contrast, the outcome model holds at early and later 
stages along the corporate life-cycle. While, as expected, dividend payouts are much 
lower when firms are ‘immature’ i.e., have negative or low ratios of retained equity to 
assets (or total equity), compared to when firms are ‘mature’, and at all stages along  
the corporate life-cycle, better-governed firms pay larger dividends than their  
poorly-governed counterparts. However, on closer inspection, I find that they can only do 
so provided creditor rights are strong. Where creditor rights are weak, shareholders of 
better-governed firms appear powerless to prevent firms from consenting to the demands 
from creditors for lower dividends. These findings are in line with those of Brockman 
and Unlu (2009), Shao et al. (2009), Byrne and O’Connor (2012). They show that the 
agency cost of equity and debt version of the outcome model of dividends holds  
i.e., dividend payouts are largest where shareholder and creditor rights are strong.  
These findings also suggest that poorly-governed firms do not substitute poor governance 
with higher dividends, as the substitution model would predict. Hence, these  
poorly-governed firms either do not view dividends as a bonding mechanism, or 
alternatively, they may use alternative bonding devices e.g., cross-list internationally to 
reduce the agency costs of poor governance.  
Table 8 Using cash holdings as a proxy for corporate life-cycle and a larger sample size 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High cash/TA  
(Immature)  
Low cash/TA  
(Mature) 
 
Full 
sample 
Low 
cash/TA 
(Mature) 
High 
cash/TA  
(Immature) 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Ordinary least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.242* 
(1.67) 
0.525*** 
(2.83) 
0.278* 
(1.69) 
0.654* 
(1.72) 
–0.176 
(0.82) 
0.580*** 
(2.91) 
–0.229 
(0.20) 
        
# Firms 281 141 140 55 85 38 103 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.325 0.202 0.314 0.400 0.366 0.258 0.301 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  1.81* 2.41*** 2.52*** 
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Table 8 Using cash holdings as a proxy for corporate life-cycle and a larger sample size 
(continued) 
Dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%) 
 Life-cycle stage  
High cash/TA  
(Immature)  
Low cash/TA  
(Mature) 
 
Full 
sample 
Low 
cash/TA 
(Mature) 
High 
cash/TA  
(Immature) 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
High  
CR 
Low  
CR 
Weighted least squares 
Corporate 
governance 
0.235* 
(1.70) 
0.495** 
(2.46) 
0.228 
(1.36) 
0.643* 
(1.69) 
–0.186 
(0.80) 
0.619*** 
(3.14) 
–0.114 
(0.18) 
        
# Firms 281 141 140 55 85 38 103 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.568 0.501 0.304 0.423 0.392 0.286 0.456 
  Tests of significance (t-test) 
  1.91* 2.45*** 2.61*** 
This table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary and weighted least squares 
regressions with heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis. 
The weight of each observation (firm) in the weighted least squares regressions is the 
inverse of the number of observations (firms) in each country. The sample period is for 
the year 2001, and the sample is extended to 281 firms in total. Separate regressions are 
estimated for the full sample of firms, for firms with high (above-median, ‘immature’) 
and low (below-median, ‘immature’) cash to total assets (Cash/TA), and for ‘mature’ and 
‘immature’ firms in countries with high (above-median i.e., creditor rights measure 
greater than 2) and low (below-median i.e., creditor rights measure less than and equal to 
2) creditor rights. The dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%), dividends to 
cashflow (%), and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. A full set of controls are included, 
but not reported. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance 
measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, and *, **, and *** 
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The significance tests  
(t-statistic) test whether the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable is 
statistically different in either different stages of the corporate life-cycle (equation (1)) or 
in different creditor rights regimes (equation (2)). In both instances, the test-statistic is 
calculated by estimating either equation (1) or equation (2), and testing the statistical 
significance of β2. Low Cash/TA equals 1 if Cash/TA is below the sample median, and 
zero otherwise. High Creditor equals 1 if creditor rights are greater than 2, and zero 
otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
DIV GOV GOV Low Cash/TA Size Growth Profitability
Low Cash/TA TE RE/TA Industry Country
i i i i i i i
i i i i c i
α β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (1) 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV GOV High Creditor Size Growth Profitability
Cash/TA TE RE/TA High Creditor Industry
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 (2) 
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Notes 
1The signalling models of dividends suggest that dividend initiations lead and not lag (as the  
life-cycle model of dividends predicts) firm profitability (see for example Ross, 1977; 
Bhattacharya, 1979). 
2For a review of the life-cycle model of dividends, see Bulan and Subramanian (2009). 
3In continental Europe and Asia, the ‘principal-agent’ problem is best characterized as a conflict 
between a principal and a principal, namely the controlling and minority shareholders, as opposed 
to managers and shareholders. Faccio et al. (2001) show that the risk of expropriation of minority 
insiders in family/closely held European firms is reduced because of sizable dividend payouts. For 
similar firms in Asia, dividend payouts tend to be much lower.  
4Using a sample of US firms, Chae et al. (2009) show that dividend payout increases in both 
corporate governance and the amount of free cash flow. However, in the absence of free cash flow, 
dividend payout actually decreases in the strength of corporate governance i.e., the substitution 
model prevails. 
5Some papers focus solely on the relationship between the strength of corporate governance and the 
dividend amount (see Mitton, 2004; Sawicki, 2009; Chae et al., 2009). Others establish the 
relationship between the strength of corporate governance and the likelihood of paying a dividend 
and the dividend amount (see Byrne and O’Connor, 2012; Bartram et al., 2012). Brockman and 
Unlu (2009, 2011), Byrne and O’Connor (2012), and Shao et al. (2009) all focus on the 
relationship between country measures of shareholder (and creditor) rights and the likelihood of 
paying a dividend and the dividend amount. 
6Debt also serves to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. Mansi and Wald (2011) show that 
where firms face limitations on the use of debt, they pay larger dividends to reduce the free cash 
flow problem. 
7The results of these tests using US firms are mixed. Using the anti-takeover governance index of 
Gompers et al. (2003) to measure the strength of corporate governance of US firms, John and 
Knyazeva (2006), Officer (2011), Jo and Pan (2009), Jiraporn and Ning (2006) find in favour of 
the substitution model. Again using US firms, but now using governance data from the 
Institutional Shareholder Services, Jiraporn et al. (2011) find evidence in favour of the outcome 
model. The ISS data is a much broader corporate governance measure than the G-Index, which in 
turn, likely explains the conflicting findings. 
8Ideally, I would have liked to have used a sample of developed and emerging market firms in this 
paper. I focus solely on emerging market firms since I do not have access to corporate governance 
data for developed market firms, and only have access to corporate governance data for emerging 
market firms for the year 2001.  
9Others do concentrate on the agency models of total payout. These include Bartram et al. (2012), 
Mansi and Wald (2011), and Petrasek (2012). I focus solely on dividend payouts because I do not 
have access to share repurchase data. 
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10Like Mitton (2004) and La Porta et al. (2000) I assume that past growth rates proxy for future 
growth opportunities. Hence, I do not use the market-to-book ratio as a measure of a firm’s future 
growth opportunities.  
11The dividend polices of publicly traded and private firms tend to be different. Rommens et al. 
(2012) compare the dividend policies of public and privately held firms in Belgium. They show 
that privately held firms typically do not pay a dividend, and for those that do, the dividend 
payout is less than that of publicly-traded firms. 
12A large literature exists which examines the firm and country-level factors which promote firms 
to practice better corporate governance (see for example, Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005, 2007). These ‘governance-predictions’ studies find that amongst others, large firms, 
firms with a need for external finance, and firms with large proportion of ‘soft/intangible’ assets 
practice good corporate governance. They also find that corporate governance improves with 
ownership concentration, provided there is no deviation from one-share-one-vote (i.e., dual-class 
firms typically have poorer governance than single-class share firms). Cross-listing firms and 
firms domiciled where country governance (e.g., shareholder rights strong, efficient judiciary) is 
strong also tend to be better governed. However, Doidge et al. (2007) show that some firms with 
these ‘desirable’ characteristics may not necessarily practice better governance, since the costs of 
doing so can outweigh the perceived benefits. The costs of doing so are greater where financial 
development weak. Aggarwal et al. (2009) highlight the differences in governance practices 
between US and non-US firms, and show that amongst others, differences in financial 
development between the US and non-US countries can explain part of the superior governance 
practices of US firms. Furthermore, recent work suggests that some firms do not adopt  
‘desirable’ aspects of corporate governance since their adoption can prove to be value-decreasing 
(Black et al., 2012). 
13Klapper and Love (2004) show that the variation in corporate governance ratings (using CLSA 
corporate governance scores) decreases as country level investor protection increases. 
14The best and worst governed firms in the sample have governance scores of 92.77 and 11.77, 
respectively (Range is 81). The interquartile range is 21.56.  
15The maximum (and range since the minimum dividend payout is zero) dividends to earnings, 
cashflow, and sales is 85.5, 82.2, and 21.0%, respectively.  
16Firms are designated into one of 13 industries based on the following classifications using  
4-digit SIC codes: Agriculture and Food (0100-0999 & 2000-2111); Mining and Construction 
(1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399); Textiles and Printing/Publishing (2200-2799); Chemicals 
(2800-2824, 2840-2899); Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836); Extractive (2900-2999, 1300-1399); 
Durable Manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579); Transportation (4000-4899);  
Utilities (4900-4999); Retail (5000-5999); Services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379); 
Computers (7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679); Public Administration (9000+). 
17Mitton (2004) estimates variants of equations 1 and 2. His version of equation 1 excludes cash, 
total equity and retained equity, and excludes these same variables and creditor rights from 
equation 2. Using both dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%), the coefficient 
estimates on the corporate governance variable is comparable across studies. For example, using 
equation 1, the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable reported by Mitton 
(2004) is 0.278 and 0.056 (Using dividends to cashflow (%) and dividends to sales (%)), 
respectively. I report coefficient estimates of 0.270 and 0.070, respectively. Using dividends to 
earnings (%), the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable are much larger in 
this study (0.369) compared to 0.271 in Mitton (2004). 
18The conclusions are qualitatively unaffected when I use RE/TE in place of RE/TA.  
19Bartram et al. (2012) do find support for the outcome model when they use Spamann’s (2010) 
anti-director rights measure. 
20My results remain qualitatively unchanged when I exclude countries with a single observation 
(firm) i.e., Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Poland. 
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21For brevity sake, I only present the results using retained equity to total assets. The conclusions 
remain qualitatively unchanged when I use the ratio of retained equity to total equity to proxy for 
the corporate life-cycle. These results are presented in an earlier working paper version of this 
paper, and are also available from me upon request. 
22The significance tests (t-statistic) reported in Table 3 test whether the coefficient estimates on  
the corporate governance variable is statistically different at different stages of the corporate life-
cycle (‘Mature’ vs. ‘Immature’ firms). The test-statistic is calculated by estimating the following 
regression and testing the statistical significance of β2. In all three cases, the coefficient estimate 
for β2 is positive, and statistically significant in two of three cases. High RE/TA equals 1 if firms 
are ‘mature’, that is, RE/TA is above the sample median. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
DIV GOV GOV High RE/TA Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE High RE/TA Industry Country
i i i i i i i
i i i i c i
α β β β β β
β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 
23Brockman and Unlu (2009) and Shao et al. (2009) use country-level shareholder rights measures. 
Byrne and O’Connor (2012) use country and firm-level measures of shareholder rights. 
24I define strong (weak) creditor rights where creditor rights are greater than (equal to and  
less than) 2. By defining strong creditor rights in this way, I achieve a more even distribution of 
firms across the two groupings i.e., high and low creditor rights. If on the other hand, I was to 
define strong creditor rights where creditor rights is 2 or greater, the number of firms in the weak 
creditor rights grouping falls to just 13 firms (from 52). 
25I prefer to estimate equation (1) by stage of creditor rights (and firm maturity) as Shao et al. 
(2009), Byrne and O’Connor (2012) also do, and refrain from using interaction terms  
(e.g., corporate governance × creditor rights) because at low levels of creditor rights, the debt and 
equity inclusive substitution model prevails (i.e., there is a negative relationship between 
shareholder rights and dividend payout), but at higher levels of creditor rights, the debt and equity 
inclusive outcome model prevails (i.e., there is a positive relationship between shareholder rights 
and dividend payout). Estimating equation (1) by sub-sample is better suited to capturing these 
distinct effects. 
26The significance tests (t-statistic) outlined in Table 4, test whether the coefficient estimates on  
the corporate governance variable is statistically different in different creditor rights regimes 
(Above and below-median creditor rights). The test-statistic is calculated by estimating the 
following regression and testing the statistical significance of β2. In all three cases, the coefficient 
estimate for β2 is positive, and statistically significant in two of three cases. High Creditor  
equals 1 if creditor rights are greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV GOV High Creditor Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE RE/TA High Creditor Industry
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
 
27In Appendix 2, I present coefficient estimates estimated by weighted least squares by level of firm 
maturity (RE/TA) and strength of creditor rights. These coefficient estimates serve to confirm the 
findings presented in Table 4. 
28I would like to sincerely thank Sohnke Bartram for providing me with his dividend tax advantage 
data. 
29The conclusions remain the same when I use either dividends to cashflow (%) or dividends to 
sales (%).  
30Interestingly, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that growth is negatively related to dividend 
payout, but only for ‘mature’ firms. Presumably, since many ‘immature’ firms do not pay a 
dividend, differences in growth rates across firms do not lead to differences in dividend payout 
across these same firms. Growth negatively affects the dividend payouts of ‘mature’ firms, likely 
because these firms pay a dividend, and ‘mature’ firms exhibit much greater variation in dividend 
payouts than do ‘immature’ firms.  
31Social awareness has a 10% weighting, while the other six (management discipline, transparency, 
independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness) have a 15% weighting in the composite 
corporate governance measure.  
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32Note than in Table 7, I use the ratio of cash to total assets to proxy for the corporate life-cycle for 
the original sample of 220 firms. 
Appendix 1: Variable description 
Variable 
Description (With Worldscope identification number 
where relevant) Source 
Dividends to  
earnings (%) 
(Dividends per share (WS05101)/earnings per share 
(WS05201)) × 100 
Worldscope 
Dividends to  
cashflow (%) 
(Dividends per share (WS05101)/cashflow per share 
(WS05510)) × 100 
Worldscope 
Dividends to sales (%) (Dividends per share (WS05101)/sales per share 
(WS05508)) × 100 
Worldscope 
Size Log of book assets in US$ (WS02999) Worldscope 
Growth Logarithmic one-year asset growth (WS02999) Worldscope 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) 
(WS18191) to book assets (WS02999) 
Worldscope 
Cash Cash (WS02003) scaled by book assets (WS02999) Worldscope 
Total equity Total shareholders’ equity (WS03995) scaled by 
book assets (WS02999) 
Worldscope 
Retained equity  
to total assets 
Retained equity (WS03495) to total assets 
(WS02999) 
Worldscope 
Retained equity  
to total equity 
Retained equity (WS 03495) to total equity 
(WS03995) 
Worldscope 
Corporate governance Equally-weighted composite measure of six distinct 
governance categories, namely management 
discipline, transparency, independence, 
accountability, responsibility, and fairness 
CLSA (2001) 
Shareholder rights Both Spamann (2010) and Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (DLLS)  
(Djankov et al., 2008) present a revised version of 
the original version of the anti-director rights index 
of La Porta et al. (1998). The index of DLLS (2008) 
ranges from 1 (weak shareholder rights) to 5 (strong 
shareholder rights). The Spamann (2010) index 
ranges from 2 to 5 (using 1997 values) and 2 to 6 
(using 2005 values) 
Spamann (2010) 
and Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights, following  
La Porta et al. (1998) 
The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 
(strong creditor rights) and is constructed as at 
January for every year from 1978 to 2003. I use 
creditor rights for the year 2001 
Djankov et al. 
(2007) 
Dividend tax 
advantage 
Measured as the after-tax value of one dollar paid 
out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of one 
dollar paid out in capital gains 
Bartram et al. 
(2012), Fidrmuc 
and Jacob (2010) 
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Appendix 2: Regression estimates by level of RE/TA and creditor rights 
Dividend payout measure 
Dividends to earnings 
(%) 
 Dividends to cashflow 
(%) 
 Dividends to sales 
(%) 
 
Low  
creditor 
High  
creditor 
Low  
creditor 
High  
creditor 
Low  
creditor 
High  
creditor 
High RE/TA (Mature) 
Corporate 
governance 
0.173 
(0.54) 
0.380 
(1.44) 
0.038 
(0.14) 
0.495** 
(2.43) 
0.146*** 
(2.97) 
0.211*** 
(4.16) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Firms 52 58 52 58 52 58 
R-squared 0.257 0.331 0.365 0.202 0.518 0.291 
 Tests of significance (t-test) 
 0.77 2.08** 1.39 
Low RE/TA (Immature) 
Corporate 
governance 
–0.182 
(0.43) 
0.999*** 
(3.03) 
0.163 
(0.65) 
0.544** 
(2.42) 
0.002 
(0.05) 
0.059 
(1.09) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
dummies 
No No No No No No 
Industry 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Firms 74 36 74 36 74 36 
R-squared 0.209 0.423 0.350 0.284 0.422 0.323 
 Tests of significance (t-test) 
 2.56*** 2.14*** 1.45 
This table reports coefficient estimates from weighted least squares regressions with 
heteroscedastic consistent t-stats presented underneath in parenthesis. The weight of each 
observation (firm) is the inverse of the number of observations (firms) in each country. 
The sample period is for the year 2001. Separate regressions are estimated for firms with 
high (above-median) and low (below-median) retained equity to total assets (RE/TA), 
domiciled in countries with high (above-median i.e., creditor rights measure greater than 
and equal to 2) and low (below-median i.e., creditor rights measure less than 2) creditor 
rights. The dependent variable is dividends to earnings (%), dividends to cashflow (%), 
and dividends to sales (%), as indicated. A full set of controls are included, but not 
reported. All firm-level data is sourced from Worldscope. Corporate governance 
measures are from CLSA (2001). # Firms is the number of firms, and *, **, and *** 
denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The significance tests  
(t-statistic) test whether the coefficient estimates on the corporate governance variable is 
statistically different in different creditor rights regimes. The test-statistic is calculated by 
estimating the following regression and testing the statistical significance of β2.  
High Creditor equals 1 if creditor rights are equal to and greater than 2, and zero 
otherwise. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
DIV GOV GOV High Creditor Size Growth Profitability
Cash TE RE High Creditor Industry
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
α β β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + × + + +
+ + + + + +
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